Democratization of Uruguay

Giancarlo Orichio Dr. A. Arraras CPO 3055 20 November 2008 Democratic innovation and Consolidation Uruguay A study of democratization presumes that the meaning of democratization is taken for granted(predicate) defined simply as a transition of a goernmental body from non- republic towards accountable and legate goernment practices. (Grugel 3) A concept that is sound in Uruguayan political relation thus far, has an element of electric potential risk that bothow be the topic of further analysis.Assessment of the latter will modify us to determine why Uruguay is the only one of the four-spot motive bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in South the States that includes chilli, Brazil, and Argentina to attain this debatably political position quo. Guillermo ODonnell described this type of regime as an institution that uses absolute measures to respond to what they view as threats to capitalism, whereas, the only message of opposing this substituterictive g everywherenmen t is by an unconditional commitment to state. (ODonnell xiii) The hierarchic confederate get hold of bureaucratic-authoritarian regime as a political actor poses a possible favor to democratization insofar that the military-as-institution may consider that their interests are high hat served by extrication from the military-as-government. However, seizing power to a invigorated governing eubstance without imposing slopped constraints is improbable and has occurred predictably in Uruguayan republican transition. Understanding the obstacle faced by the newly fragile antiauthoritarian government in managing the military and eliminating its reserved domains studys us to the task at hand.First, I will analyze the political history in Uruguay that lead up to the no doubt controversial argument that it has attained elected consolidation. Secondly, I will analyze the factors that either contri aloneed or hindered its journey to repre directative democracy ultimately, arriving to the conclusion that Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan describe as a risk-prone consolidated democracy. On 25 August 1825, Juan Antonio Lavalleja, at the head of a group of patriots called the treinta y tres orientales, eventd a declaration of independence. After a three-year fight, a peace agreement signed on 28 August 1828 guaranteed Uruguays independence.During this degree of political unrest and civil war, the two political parties around which Uruguayan history has traditionally revolved, the cobalts and the Blancos, were founded. Even by West Europen standards, Uruguay had a tradition of proud political companionship identification and a clear sense of a left-right index. (Linz 152) Uruguays first president, Gen. Jose Fructuoso Rivera, an ally of Artigas, founded the Colorados. The second president, Brig. Gen. Manuel Oribe, a friend of Lavalleja, founded the Blancos. The 19th hundred was largely a struggle between the two factions.However, it was non until the election of Jose Batlle y Ordonez as president in 1903 that Uruguay matured as a terra firma. The Batlle cheeks (19037, 191115) marked the period of greatest stinting performance. A distinguished call forthsman, Batlle initiated the friendly welfare outline codified in the Uruguayan constitution. From then on, Uruguays social programs, funded primarily by clams of beef and wool in alien markets, gave Uruguay the revered last name Switzerland of South America. After World War II, the Colorados ruled, except for an eight-year period from 195866.It was during the administration of President Jorge Pacheco Areco (196772) that Uruguay entered a political and social crisis. As wool declined in world markets, export earnings no longer kept pace with the need for great social expenditures. Political instability resulted, intimately dramatically in the emergence of Uruguays National Liberation Movement, popularly known as the Tupamaros. This well-organized urban guerrilla movement adopte d Marxist and nationalist ideals fleck on the early(a) hand, most nationally important actors were disloyal or at best semi-loyal to the already established representative regime.Their revolutionary activities, pair with the worsening sparingalal situation, exacerbated Uruguays political uncertainty. Gradually, the military-as institution assumed a greater role in government and by 1973 was in complete run across of the political system. By the end of 1973, the Tupamaros had been successfully controlled and suppressed by the military-as-institution. In toll of systematic repression, as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan stated, Uruguay was the most deeply repressive of the four South American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. (Linz 152) Amnesty international denounced Uruguay for valet de chambre rights violations in 1979, they estimated the heel of political prisoners jailed at a ratio of 1 per 600, Chile and Argentina were respectively 1 in 2,000 and 1 in 1,200. (Linz 152 ) By 1977 the military announced that they would devise a new constitution with the intentions to beef up democracy. The new constitution would be submitted to a plebiscite in 1980, and if ratified elections with a single presidential campaigner nominated by both the Colorados and the Blancos and ratified by the military would be held the following year.The post-authoritarian transition to democracy began in Uruguay when the elected opposition won the plebiscite. By the 1980s the military did non have an offensive plan to lift Uruguay from its uninterrupted bad economic performance, the Tupamaros had in fact been defeated by 1973, so a falsifying project against urban guerrilla was unnecessary. The military had no civil or political support, and with there loss in the plebiscite, whose results they said they would respect, tarnished the militarys political leverage significantly.Thus, the democratic opposition in the form of the two major catch all political parties that have governed de jure since the 19 century presented a non threatening alternative despite their disloyal behavior forward the authoritarian coup detat . As previously touched on, the opportunities presented by a hierarchical military favoring democratic transition is the possibility that the stellar(a) officers of the military-as-institution will come to the conclusion that the cost of non democratic rule is greater than the cost of extrication.With the main interest resting in a stable state that will in turn allow the military to become a functioning sector of the state apparatus. However, this does not preclude the possibility of non democratic prerogatives in the transfer. The party-military negotiation called the marine Club Pact disqualified Wilson Ferreira of the Blanco party to be nominated as president, pushed for guarantees concerning their own autonomy, and the most damaging to democracy was the curtailment of human right trails for military officials.Elections were held i n 1985 were Julio Maria Sanguinetti from the Colorado party became the first democratically elected candidate in the 1977 constitution. Because of strong public discontent with Military Amnesty granted during the transition, the curtailment was sent to a referendum in 1989, were it approved the absolution and gained democratic legitimacy by 57%. It has to be stated that the majority of Uruguayan opposed the amnesty, however the fragile democratic government confronted a troubling decision. They could have breached the Naval Club Pact and tried military officer for heir human right offenses and risked military refusal and therefore a crisis in their own authority. Or they could have hastily granted them amnesty at the cost of get down prestige in the new democracy. It is safe to assume that the electorate voted to let the amnesty law stand not because it was just but more so to avoid a crisis. By 1992 the left-wing Frente Amplio was integrated into Uruguayan politics without any ot her major party leaders deeming them unacceptable arriving to the quarrelsome argument that Uruguay became a consolidated democracy.Uruguays economic development can be divided into two starkly contrasting periods. During the first period, when it earned its set sobriquet Switzerland of South America, from the late 1800s until the 1950s, Uruguay achieved remarkable growth and a high standard of living. Expanding livestock exports principally beef and wool accounted for its economic development. The move social welfare programs, which redistributed wealth from the livestock sector to the rest of the economy, raised the standard of living for the majority of the population and contributed to the development of new industries.When export earnings faltered in the 1950s, however, the fabric of Uruguays economy had begun to unravel. The country entered a decades-long period of economic stagnation. It was during the administration of President Jorge Pacheco Areco (196772) that Uruguay en tered a political and social crisis. As wool and beef demands declined in world markets, export earnings no longer kept pace with the need for greater social expenditures causing bad economic performance that lead to the bureaucratic-authoritarian take over of government.Although the old democratic regime was not able to lift economic prosperity neither was the military-as-government. Bad economic performance still plagued the nation throughout authoritarian rule. By 1980 the military had no agenda in combating the bad economic performance that helped unveil the inadequacies of the non democratic regime. In fact, economic performance has been in a decline since 1950s until today. Although the legitimacy that the democratic system posses in Uruguay is strong, the capacity, or as Stepan and Linz say, the efficacy of the democratic system in resolving the stagnant economy is low.Thus, making Uruguays democracy risk-prone due to an unsolved economic performance. Since the economy has be en the number one issue affecting Uruguayans since the end of their golden era in the early 19 century. A public opinion poll was asked to upper class respondents go a political alternative from the authoritarian regime at the succession would speed rather than slow economic recuperation. By a circumference of 2 to 1 they believed it would, more surprisingly was a 7 to 1 response to the question if a new democratic regime would bring more tranquility and public order.In 1985, of the nine institutions evaluated in terms of trust, political parties ranked highest with a net score of 57 and the arm forces with a net score of negative 73. Only 5% viewed the military sympathetically while 78% viewed the military with antipathy. (Linz 153) In my studies concerning democratization never did democracy start with such rejection of the political role of the military from all class coalitions alike.During the first half on the 19th century the norm was a two party system similar to that of the coupled States in that there was low atomization and low polarization. (Linz 163) However, contrary to the American vetting work at the Uruguayan had a peculiar electoral system known as the double simultaneous vote that allows all parties to run multiple candidate for the presidency. This did not present a problem until after the 1960s when presidents routinely were elected with less than 25% of the vote because of the amount of candidates running.This creates party fragmentation that can hinder democracy. The fact that the old regime political expression remains untouched means that the opportunity for constitutional change was at sea and this presents a potential democratic upheaval. Behaviorally, by 1968-73 political elites were at best semi-loyal to the democratic system that soon caused the authoritarian regime to take over government, and one thing that can be done from previous failures in democratic attempts is to learn from their missteps.Stepan and Linz clearly state that for the consolidation of democracy verity to the system as well as the perception that all other parties are loyal to the democratic process plays a crucial role. (Linz 156) By 1985 not one of the twelve major factions of the three leading parties sensed the other parties to be acting disloyal. As well as the untainted fact that the once unacceptable left-wing party, Frente Amplio, held the mayoral position of capital of Uruguay by 1989 and then the presidency by 2004 demonstrates the positive elite choices that contributed to democracy.Since Uruguays troublesome and long fought battle for independence in August 25, 1828 Uruguay did not encounter any intermestic stateness problems. As far as Washington transaction to Latin America and in particular Uruguay, the United States continues to pursue hegemony over the region. The neo-liberal reforms in place in the region are bound by the restraints of the global market and for a country like Uruguay it is very hard-fought to compete with such superpowers.These reforms have often left the lower classes impoverish and desperate while the upper classes and Washington feed their gluttonous appetites. The civil government in Uruguay has found it increasingly difficult to enforce these foreign economic influences that can potentially result in authoritarian means of accomplishment. As a member of MERCOSUR, Mercado Comun del Sur, Uruguay faced foreign political influences to alter its economy during the 1990s, as economic giants, and MERCOSUR partners Brazil and Argentina had done.This can be potentially devastating to democracy except that Uruguay in the 1980s had a gross national product (GNP) per capita income of 2,820, higher than any of its MERCOSUR counterparts. However, we must consider that Uruguay has been experiencing a downward economic performance since the mid 1900s and is a potential risk that needs to be addressed to preserve democracy. United States foreign policy in Uruguay and in the rest of Latin America has encouraged for the liberalization of markets. The side effect of neo-liberal reform is the zero-sum element that produces ebullient amounts of losers.Essentially the contrary to what it is intended to produce. These superpower polices implemented creates few winners most of which are elites with government connection that have been the primary beneficiaries of the sweeping economic transformation. (Kingstone 196) This transcends business when the only means of preserving this market economy is through potential authoritarian means. The contentious claim that Uruguay is a consolidated democracy since 1992 is threefold, first, because of the vacillation to fix the already proven failed double simultaneous vote electoral system.Secondly, because of civil-military relations concerning human rights violation during authoritarian rule, although was legitimized by democratic referendum, but more importantly budgetary cuts that have been implemented as a result of bad economic performance. Finally, and most importantly, Uruguayans accept democracy as the most legitimate political game, but also recognize its stupidity to fix the troubling economy, producing this efficacy-legitimacy gap that can be potentially erosive for democracy.These three factors give Uruguay the title of a risk-prone democracy. Works Cited Kingstone, Peter R. , ed. Readings in Latin American Politics. New York Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. ODonnell, Guillermo. modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Studies in South American Politics. Berkley Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.